Me vs. The Supremes – Part X

On October 20, 2008, I filed my Third Lawsuit against the Supremes this time seeking the forfeiture of the offices of Justice of the United States Supreme Court held by Defendants Samuel Anthony Alito, Jr., Stephen G. Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Anthony M. Kennedy, John G. Roberts, Jr., Antonin Scalia, David Hackett Souter, John Paul Stevens and Clarence Thomas for their misbehavior in office in violation of Article III, §1 of the United States Constitution.

That is when something stinky hit the fan . . .

When a lawsuit is filed, the first job of the Plaintiff is to serve the defendants with copies of the lawsuit. I promptly served by mail as allowed under the Rules of Procedure each of the Justices. However, though an authorized form of service, the justices refused to acknowledge receipt of the lawsuit thus forcing me to personally serve them.

Thus it was on December 3, 2008, that my process server and I marched into the United States Supreme Court building and announced to the guard that we had a federal lawsuit to serve on the nine justices and could we be led to their chambers to affect the service? We were quickly surrounded with men obviously carrying weapons. After being told to wait in the cafeteria for an hour, one of the Court’s praetorian guards appeared and announced that he was authorized to accept service of the lawsuit on behalf of each of the justices. The legal machinery to settle my claim that the justices had engaged in “misbehavior” warranting forfeiture of their offices was now in gear and moving forward.

On January 5, 2009, an assistant United States Attorney filed his “Notice of Appearance by Wynne Patrick Kelly on behalf of all defendants”. This was a formal notice that the Defendants had properly received a copy of the lawsuit and had an attorney representing their interests in the lawsuit.

But there was a problem: Under 28 Code of Federal Regulations, §50.15(b)(1): “Representation is not available [by the Attorney General or his designee] to a federal employee whenever: The conduct with regard to which the employee desires representation does not reasonably appear to have been performed within the scope of his employment with the federal government." (Emphasis added).

I immediately made a motion under §50.15(b)(1) to disqualify the United States Attorney’s Office from representing the Defendant Justices as a priori, the government cannot maintain that it was within the “scope of employment” of the Defendant Justices to decide a case in which they were named party-defendants as the Defendant Justices are expressly barred from employment by the federal government in that manner by 28 U.S.C. §455(b)(5)(i). As alleged in the Third Lawsuit at ¶39, by entering their order of November 14, 2005, the Defendant Justices violated 28 U.S.C. §455(b)(5)(i) which expressly limits the “scope of [their] employment” to deciding cases presented to them in which they are not a “party to the proceeding”.

Stated another way, to hold that the Defendant Justices were acting within the scope of their employment when deciding Case Number: 05-459 would be to hold that breaking the law is within the scope of a federal government employee’s employment – an absurd notion. Accord: Tremblay v. Webster, 1995 WL 93405, *7, 1995 Conn.Super. LEXIS 516, *21-22 (Conn.Sup.Ct.1995)(“. . .violating the plaintiffs’ civil rights [under federal and state law] cannot be considered to be in the troopers' normal scope of their employment . . .”). Accordingly, I argued, under §50.15(b)(1), “representation is not available” to the Defendant Justices by the United States Attorney’s office.

What happened next was an clear indication to me that there was now panic at 1 First Street, N.E. Washington, D.C.