Thursday, June 11, 2009

Me vs. The Supremes – Part XI

On January 14, 2009, I filed my motion to Disqualify United States Attorney from representing defendant Justices. In the normal course, the attorney for the Defendant Justices would have filed his memorandum of law in opposition to the motion, I would have had a chance to reply to the legal memorandum and then the Court would either hold oral argument or rule on the filed legal papers.Publish Post

That would not happen in this case . . .

Instead, on January 21, 2009, the judge assigned to this Third Lawsuit – U.S. District Court Judge Richard J. Leon (pictured above) – entered an order holding in sum that: “Because the Court does not have jurisdiction over either of these claims, plaintiff's complaint is dismissed SUA SPONTE.”

In law, the term sua sponte (Latin “of one's own accord”) means to act spontaneously without prompting from another party. The term is usually applied to actions by a judge taken without a prior motion or request from the parties. Hence, though the Third Lawsuit had been filed on October 20, 2008, Judge Leon waited until faced with my January 14, 2009, devastating motion to Disqualify the United States Attorney from representing the defendant Justices to dismiss the lawsuit. Clearly, Judge Leon did not want to have to address my motion to disqualify for the result – removing the Untied States Attorney’s Office from representing the Defendant Justices – would cause a major inconvenience to those justices.

Notably, the Supreme Court has never authorized a sua sponte dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. In this Circuit, in Brandon v. District of Columbia Bd. of Parole, 734 F.2d 56 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1127 (1985), the court in discussing sua sponte dismissals said: "When a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is filed, the plaintiff is put on notice that the legal sufficiency of the complaint is being challenged and is often given some insight into the theory upon which that challenge is made. The plaintiff then has an opportunity to develop his claim further by filing an opposition to the Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Alternatively, the plaintiff may seek to show that decision on the motion would be premature before the facts were further drawn out through discovery. Neither of these opportunities, nor the sharply honed adversarial exchange involved in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and opposition, are present when dismissal is sua sponte." (Emphasis added).

Subsequently, in Baker v. Director, U.S. Parole Com'n, 916 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1990), the court said: “The dispositive question in this case is whether we may affirm the district court's sua sponte dismissal of the complaint. The district court, relying on Rule 12(b)(6), disposed of Baker’s action prior to service, and without providing Baker with notice or an opportunity to respond. . . . Because it is patently obvious that Baker could not have prevailed on the facts alleged in his complaint, we find that sua sponte dismissal was appropriate.” Id. at 726-727.

Hence, Judge Leon had apparent authority to dismiss my Third Lawsuit without allowing me the opportunity to be heard if, and only if, it was “patently obvious” I “could not have prevailed on the facts alleged in his complaint.”

As will be subsequently detailed, it was far from “patently obvious” that I could not prevail and the intellectual dishonesty of Judge Leon’s actions in dismissing my Third Lawsuit showed that I had struck a blow to the judicial oligarchy which had sent them reeling.


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