Me vs. The Supremes -- Part III

At the end of my first of three lawsuits against the Justices of the United States Supreme Court, those Justices decided not to review my case. By so doing, they had sat in judgment upon a case in which they were named defendants. Such behavior violated not only the ancient fundamental right known as nemo judex parte sua (no man shall judge his own case), but also 28 U.S.C. §455(b)(5)(i) which is a federal statute which requires that a Supreme Court justice disqualify himself from a matter when he or she is: “is a party to the proceeding . . .” Clearly, the nine sitting justices who decided my first of three lawsuits broke the law. But where lay the adverse consequence to the Justices for their callous disregard of my fundamental and statutory right to an impartial tribunal? 

Sadly, Congress in passing §455(b)(5)(i) created no remedy for a breach of that statute by a judge. If a lower court judge breached §455(b)(5)(i), then of course an appellate court might grant relief by reversing the decision and returning the case to the lower court with an order that a new judge be assigned. But when the Supreme Court violates §455(b)(5)(i), to whom to you appeal?

In my case, I saw only one avenue: appeal to a jury of my peers for relief by way of a civil suit for damages. But if §455(b)(5)(i) provided no basis for a civil lawsuit, upon what authority could such a suit be maintained? Gratefully, in the famous case of Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the United States Supreme Court held that: “where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief.” Moreover, in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), that same Court held: 

In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one, several factors are relevant. First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted. . . Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? . . . Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? . . . And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law.

Without undertaking a detailed statutory analysis, it should be plain that the four factors found in Cort v. Ash clearly authorized my suit for damages against the Justices who violated §455(b)(5)(i). 

Thus, on January 18, 2006, I filed a second complaint against Justice Stephen G. Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, David Hackett Souter, John Paul Stephens and Clarence Thomas. (Justices Rehnquist had died a few days after I served him with the complaint, so I dropped him from the lawsuit). In that second suit, I sought judgment for damages of more than Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000) for: (i) “judicial treason” as defined in in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821), (ii) violating rights secured by the Ninth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the doctrine of nemo judex in parte sua; and (iii) violating my right to impartial Justices as guaranteed at 28 U.S.C. §455.

What followed -- and is still following -- next, was -- and is -- bizarre.

End of Part III